Only time will tell

The powerful Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has been a thorn in the side of a democratic Iraq since US troops first rolled into Baghdad. Most people do not realize that one of the most powerful images of the Iraq war, the statue of Saddam Hussein being pulled down was not the "feel good" scene it was thought to be.

The Iraqi's crowded around the statue, chanting and beating on the statue with shoes once it made its historic decent to the ground were not what it appeared to be. The Iraqis were not chanting things about how wonderful the United States was, nor the coalition partners. They could have cared less, they knew who the real savior was going to be and they were chanting his name, Muqtada al-Sadr.

There was a time that I questioned the thought process behind one of our special teams not being sent to track him down, making an arrest or the probable firefight which would have occurred with security forces surrounding al-Sadr. Then it struck me, they had their hands tied, arresting Muqtada al-Sadr would have led to an all out civil war and increased attacks upon US troops as we had never before experienced, killing him would have been worse.

The on-going battle between the Sunni and Shiite sects in Iraq is not uncommon, each sect has a set of beliefs guiding them and creating hatred and distrust for the other. (An excellent source of reference describing the difference between Sunni and Shiite and what it means can be found here)

Now al-Sadr has issued a statement ordering his militiamen to redouble their battle to oust American forces, and argued that Iraq's army and police should join him in defeating "your archenemy." This will create additional problems for our troops with an expected increase in attacks and firefights.

The on-going problems and hatreds between the Sunni and the Shiite sects has created more problems for US troops than the Pentagon and Washington command structure ever imagined. It has been said by many command officers from the initial invasion that the question of what to do once Baghdad was taken had not been addressed when the battle plans for Iraq were being put together.

These same officers have openly stated they quickly discovered this oversight when asking their superior officers for guidance in the post invasion problems which immediately began to surface. They were told this had not been addressed, they should remember they were not a conquering force, but a force of liberation and to conduct themselves accordingly.

I first heard these comments made by officers while watching a military channel program which followed a few of the companies of troops during the initial invasion. I recall that I was totally taken by surprise at the remark the officer made. It was only a few days after they had entered Baghdad; they were in the process of setting up a command post somewhere and had encountered problems with the ever increasing Iraqi crowds. I immediately understood why a lot of our troops had difficulty with immediately making a transition from warrior to police mode.

Today, all of that is behind us and it has become clear that the invasion of Iraq had been well executed, but the non-existent post invasion plans has led us to this point in history where we appear to be wrong at every turn. What the future holds in Iraq is anybody's guess, only time will tell.